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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
Garth, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Alan Macfarlan’s appeal requires us to review 
the application of judicial estoppel to his complaint.  The 
District Court judge denied Macfarlan relief as to all counts 
of his complaint.  Primary among the court’s rulings was the 
grant of summary judgment to Macfarlan’s former employer, 
Ivy Hill SNF, LLC (“Ivy Hill”) based upon judicial estoppel.  
We will affirm. 
I. 
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 Macfarlan’s notice of appeal states that he was 
appealing only “. . . from the Final Judgment and Order 
entered on May 12, 2011 denying Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Reconsideration of the District Court’s Granting Summary 
Judgment to Defendant.”  That motion pertained only to his 
Count 1 claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(“FMLA”).  Macfarlan also seeks our relief based upon other 
Acts which refer to his disability and which were the subject 
of Counts 2-4 of his amended complaint.  The main challenge 
that Macfarlan makes, however, is to the District Court’s 
application of judicial estoppel.  We first dispose of two 
aspects of his appeal which have come to our attention.  Ivy 
Hill raised no objection to either the form of order entered by 
the District Court or to the limited nature of Macfarlan’s 
Notice of Appeal. 
a.  The District Court’s order 
 On July 28, 2010, the District Court granted summary 
judgment to Ivy Hill on Counts 2-4 of Macfarlan’s amended 
complaint and on his FMLA retaliation claim, which was part 
of Count 1.  Ivy Hill thereafter filed a motion for 
reconsideration as to Macfarlan’s remaining Count 1 FMLA 
claim.   
In its November 9, 2010 order granting Ivy Hill’s 
motion for reconsideration and entering summary judgment 
for Ivy Hill, the District Court, among other rulings, granted 
the defendant, Ivy Hill, summary judgment on Macfarlan’s 
remaining claim based on judicial estoppel, and therefore 
denied relief to Macfarlan on his entire Count 1 FMLA claim.  
In the same order, the District Court then ruled that “Count I 
of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.” 
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  When summary judgment is granted to the prevailing 
party, it is inappropriate and erroneous to dismiss the very 
complaint that gave rise to the summary judgment order.  
While no substantial right of Macfarlan was affected by the 
form of the District Court’s order, nonetheless good practice 
dictates that the complaint on which judgment is entered 
cannot and should not be “dismissed.”  Accordingly, 
Macfarlan not having been prejudiced by the form of the 
District Court’s order, we now disregard the District Court’s 
order of dismissal and review only the summary judgment 
disposition, which is the gravamen of Macfarlan’s appeal. 
b.  The Notice of Appeal 
 Macfarlan filed a Notice of Appeal only “from the 
final judgment and order entered on May 12, 2011 denying 
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the District Court’s 
order granting summary judgment to Defendant.”  In normal 
course, we would confine our review to the one issue 
appealed, i.e. reconsideration of the District Court’s order that 
granted summary judgment to Ivy Hill for alleged violation of 
the FMLA.  However, while Ivy Hill, as noted, did not object 
to our consideration of the other counts in Macfarlan’s 
amended complaint, and indeed, addressed them in its brief, 
we sua sponte have the obligation of considering and 
confining an appellant to the issue which he has chosen to 
appeal.  See Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 
1252, 1254 (1977) (“When an appeal is taken from a 
specified judgment only or from a part of a specified 
judgment, the court of appeals acquires thereby no 
jurisdiction to review other judgments or portions thereof not 
so specified or otherwise fairly to be inferred from the notice 
as intended to be presented for review on the appeal.”). 
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However, we are informed by our precedent in Murray 
v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 782 F.2d 432, 434-35 
(3d Cir. 1986), that in circumstances comparable to 
Macfarlan, we will review the arguments of an appellant 
pertaining to issues not designated in the Notice of Appeal.  
In Murray, we held that where the parties addressed multiple 
issues presented to the District Court, but which were not 
designated in the Notice of Appeal, we could nevertheless 
review the non-designated issues.  Accordingly, Macfarlan’s 
Notice of Appeal, which referred only to an appeal from the 
District Court’s Judgment denying his Motion for 
Reconsideration, does not preclude us from addressing 
Macfarlan’s other claims which were included in his amended 
complaint. 
II. 
 Beginning in 1989, appellant Alan Macfarlan worked 
as a maintenance director at Green Acres Rehab and Nursing 
Center (“Green Acres”).  On January 24, 2008, Macfarlan had 
a stroke, and on January 29, entered on leave under the 
FMLA, which allows eligible employees, of which 
MacFarlan was one, to take up to twelve weeks of leave due 
to a “serious health condition that makes the employee unable 
to perform the functions of the position of such employee.”  
29 U.S.C. §2612(a)(1).   
At the time that Macfarlan entered on leave, Green 
Acres’ human resources director prepared a FMLA request 
form, which Macfarlan signed.  That form noted that 
Macfarlan’s FMLA leave began on January 29, 2008 and that 
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April 8, 2008 was his “[a]nticipated date of return” from 
leave.
1
 
Beginning in February 2008, Macfarlan received short 
term disability benefits from his insurer, Unum Life Insurance 
Company of America.  On April 1, 2008, Green Acres was 
purchased by appellee Ivy Hill SNF, LLC and renamed Ivy 
Hill Rehabilitation and Nursing Care.  On April 16, 
Macfarlan’s doctor cleared him to return to work starting on 
May 1, but with the conditions that he not work more than 
four hours per day and that he not lift or otherwise move 
loads in excess of twenty pounds.  The administrator of Ivy 
Hill notified Macfarlan that part-time work was not available, 
at which time, (April 17, 2008), Macfarlan’s doctor cleared 
him to work full-time, but did not change the lifting 
restriction.   
On or about April 20, 2008, Ivy Hill terminated 
Macfarlan’s employment and notified him of that fact, at the 
same time informing him that he would not be hired back 
with any lifting restrictions.  From the time of his termination 
                                              
1
 According to Macfarlan, he selected the April 8, 
2008 date because he had a doctor’s appointment scheduled 
for that date.  When that appointment was later rescheduled to 
April 16, Macfarlan claims that he notified Green Acres’ 
human resources director.  Macfarlan asserts that he was at no 
point notified that, in spite of the rescheduled appointment, he 
still needed to return to work by April 8.  The District Court 
never made findings of fact as to whether Macfarlan ever 
notified Green Acres of the rescheduling, nor as to whether he 
was ever notified that he would still have to return to work on 
April 8. 
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until July 2008, when he was ultimately cleared to work 
without any restrictions, Macfarlan received disability 
benefits from Unum, his insurer.  Macfarlan was told that 
once his lifting restrictions had ended, he could reapply for 
employment with Ivy Hill, which he ultimately did in August 
2008.
 2
  At that time, Macfarlan also stopped receiving 
disability benefits. 
On May 20, 2009, Macfarlan filed a complaint against 
Ivy Hill.  Macfarlan thereafter amended his complaint on 
June 12, 2009, and drafted a further amendment to which Ivy 
Hill consented on November 30, 2009.  In his amended 
complaint, Macfarlan raised four counts against Ivy Hill in 
the District Court: 1) a claim for violation of the FMLA and a 
retaliation claim for exercising his FMLA rights;
3
 2) a claim 
for violation of the Rehabilitation Act; 3) a claim for violation 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”); and 4) a 
claim for violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act 
(“PHRA”).   
On July 28, 2010, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for Ivy Hill on all claims except Macfarlan’s claim 
for violation of the FMLA.  Following a motion by Ivy Hill 
for reconsideration, the District Court granted summary 
judgment for Ivy Hill on the remaining cause of action under 
the FMLA on judicial estoppel grounds.  Macfarlan filed a 
                                              
2
 Macfarlan’s application was unsuccessful, as during 
his recovery, Ivy had filled the vacancy created by his 
termination.  Macfarlan does not challenge any element of 
that employment decision in the present appeal. 
3
 Macfarlan does not appeal the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment on his FMLA retaliation claim. 
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motion for reconsideration of that order, which was denied on 
May 12, 2011.  Macfarlan timely appealed to this court. 
III. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction of Macfarlan’s suit 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a).  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We 
exercise plenary review over a District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment.  Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy 
Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2001).  We therefore 
must undertake the same inquiry as the District Court and 
determine whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the 
moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).  A 
material fact is one which “might affect the outcome of the 
suit under the governing law.”  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).  We must also view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Macfarlan (the non-
movant) and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. 
Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641, 647 (3d Cir. 2007). 
IV. 
Macfarlan’s principal contention is that the District 
Court erroneously invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
against him when it granted summary judgment to Ivy Hill on 
Macfarlan’s FMLA claim.  Macfarlan claimed in the District 
Court that Ivy violated 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), which makes 
“it unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or 
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deny the exercise of or attempt to exercise, any right provided 
under this subchapter.”  Specifically, Macfarlan alleged that 
by refusing to allow him to return to work on April 17, 2008, 
once his doctor cleared him to work full-time, albeit with 
restrictions, Ivy Hill had denied him of his rights under 29 
U.S.C. §2614(a)(1), which provides that any employee who 
takes FMLA leave “shall be entitled, on return from such 
leave . .  to be restored by the employer to the position of 
employment [previously] held by the employee . . . or . . . to 
an equivalent position.”  In order to establish a claim for 
violation of FMLA rights, an “employee only needs to show 
that he was entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that he 
was denied them.”  Callison v. Philadelphia, 430 F.3d 117, 
119 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 The District Court denied Macfarlan restoration to his 
pre-leave position, holding that judicial estoppel precluded 
him from seeking such restoration.  Accordingly, we must 
determine whether Macfarlan was entitled to his former 
position under the FMLA.  The FMLA does not require “an 
employer to provide a reasonable accommodation to an 
employee to facilitate his return to the same or equivalent 
position at the conclusion of his medical leave.”  Rinehimer 
v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375 (3d Cir. 2002).  In order for 
an employee to demonstrate entitlement to restoration, the 
employee must have been able “to perform the essential 
functions of the job without accommodation” at the time he 
sought restoration.  Id.   
In the District Court, Macfarlan argued that at the time 
he sought restoration, he was able “to perform the essential 
functions” of his job despite his physician’s restrictions.  The 
District Court concluded that Macfarlan was precluded, by 
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the doctrine of judicial estoppel, from asserting that he was 
capable of returning to work without accommodation at the 
end of his FMLA leave in April 2008 because he continued to 
receive disability benefits from Unum, his insurer, through 
August 2008.  The District Court therefore granted summary 
judgment for Ivy Hill on Macfarlan’s FMLA claim.   
Judicial estoppel is a “judge-made doctrine that seeks 
to prevent a litigant from asserting a position inconsistent 
with one that [he or she] has previously asserted in the same 
or in a previous proceeding.”  Ryan Operations G.P. v. 
Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 
1996).  The doctrine exists “to protect the integrity of the 
judicial process and to prohibit parties from deliberately 
changing positions according to the exigencies of the 
moment.”  New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 
(2001). 
 In Motley v. New Jersey State Police, 196 F.3d 160, 
164 (3d Cir. 1999), this court expressly adopted the Supreme 
Court’s framework from Cleveland v. Policy Management 
Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), for the analysis of 
judicial estoppel when the alleged prior inconsistencies affect 
subsequent statutory claims.  Because the allegedly 
inconsistent statements in the present case bear on 
Macfarlan’s claim for statutory relief under the FMLA, 
Motley instructs that we apply the Cleveland framework in 
our analysis of the District Court’s order of judicial estoppel.  
Under that principle, in order to defeat the application of 
judicial estoppel, a plaintiff must explain his inconsistent 
statements in a manner sufficient “to warrant a reasonable 
juror’s concluding that, assuming the truth of, or the 
plaintiff’s good faith belief in, the earlier statement, the 
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plaintiff could nonetheless” perform the job to which he 
sought reinstatement.  Cleveland, supra, 526 U.S. at 807. 
 We must therefore determine: A) whether Macfarlan 
made inconsistent representations, and B) if he did so, 
whether Macfarlan can provide an explanation for his 
inconsistency from which a reasonable juror could conclude 
that, despite either the truth of, or Macfarlan’s good faith 
belief in, his statements to Unum, he was nevertheless able to 
perform the material duties of his regular job while he 
collected benefits from Unum.   
As a threshold matter, Macfarlan contends that the 
District Court could only draw an inference as to any 
statements he made to his insurer, and thus had no direct 
record evidence pertaining to the content of those statements.  
We cannot agree.  One of the undisputed facts submitted as 
part of Ivy Hill’s motion for summary judgment reads, in 
part: “Plaintiff [Macfarlan] received Short Term Disability 
Insurance benefits from his Carrier for a period of six (6) 
months, from February through August, 2008, for the months 
of January through July, 2008 based on his claims to his 
Carrier and supporting medical documentation submitted to 
them on his behalf by his physicians that he was unable to 
perform the material duties of his regular occupation.”  
(Emphasis added.)  (A-117).  On the basis of that undisputed 
fact, the District Court had direct record evidence as to the 
content of Macfarlan’s representations to Unum. 
 Having established that Macfarlan represented himself 
in that manner, we must determine whether those 
representations were inconsistent with his present position.  
Macfarlan represented himself to Unum, his insurance 
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company, as “unable to perform the material duties of his 
regular occupation.”  Furthermore, the coverage under which 
Macfarlan received benefits from Unum explained that Unum 
“provides you with benefits while you are unable to perform 
the material duties of your regular occupation.”  (Emphasis 
added).  Macfarlan accepted Unum benefits under coverage 
for being “unable to perform the material duties of [his] 
occupation,” and represented himself as such.  There is 
therefore no question that he did in fact take the position vis-
à-vis his insurer that he was medically unable to perform his 
occupation’s material duties.  Macfarlan’s present position is 
wholly inconsistent with that representation, as he now claims 
that he was able to perform those same duties.  Therefore, 
unless Macfarlan provides an explanation for the 
inconsistency that satisfies the Cleveland framework, as 
discussed in Detz v. Greiner Industries, Inc., 346 F.3d 109 (3d 
Cir. 2003), the District Court’s exercise of judicial estoppel 
was proper. 
 This court has previously discussed the nature of such 
explanations, spelling out that  
the plaintiff may not, simply by disavowing a 
prior claim of total disability, perform an 
about-face and assert that he is a qualified 
individual who is capable of working.  
Rather, . . . the plaintiff must proceed from 
the premise that his previous assertion of an 
inability to work was true, or that he in good 
faith believed it to be true, and he must 
demonstrate that the assertion was 
nonetheless consistent with his ability to 
perform the essential functions of his job. . . .  
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Explanations of the sort Cleveland requires 
are, in short, contextual – they resolve the 
seeming discrepancy between a claim of 
disability and a later claim of entitlement to 
work not by contradicting what the plaintiff 
told the [benefits provider], but by 
demonstrating that those representations, 
understood in light of the unique focus and 
requirements of the [benefits provider] leave 
room for the possibility that the plaintiff is 
able to meet the essential demands of the job 
to which he claims a right under the ADA. 
Detz, supra, 346 F.3d at 118. 
 Macfarlan explains his inconsistency by arguing that 
he collected Unum disability benefits only because it was Ivy 
Hill that had decided that he, Macfarlan, was unable to return 
to work.  He argues that he himself did not represent to Unum 
that he could not work.  Yet the statement that he gave to 
Unum, and which is undisputed by Macfarlan, is “that he was 
unable to perform the material duties of his regular 
occupation.”  Macfarlan’s effort to explain the inconsistency 
is contrary to the Detz requirement that he treat his original 
statement as true or as one that he in good faith believed to be 
true.  Just as the District Court did not accept this argument, 
no more do we, and we hold that Macfarlan’s explanation 
does not satisfy the requirements of Cleveland.  The record 
does not support Macfarlan, as we have pointed out, and we 
find the same flaw in his argument that the District Court 
judge did.  Macfarlan’s statement to Unum “that he was 
unable to perform the material duties of his occupation” 
leaves no room for Macfarlan’s argument that it was not he 
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that informed Unum that he was impaired, but that it was Ivy 
Hill that did so.  Macfarlan’s two claims “crash[] face first 
against” one another, and the first estops the second.  Detz, 
supra, 346 F.3d at 120.
4
 
V. 
Macfarlan also claims that the District Court 
erroneously granted summary judgment to Ivy Hill on his 
Rehab Act, ADA, and PHRA claims.  Specifically, Macfarlan 
claims that the District Court erroneously concluded that Ivy 
Hill did not consider Macfarlan to be disabled.   
As an initial matter, we note that the Rehab Act, ADA, 
and PHRA (“the Acts”) are all to be interpreted consistently, 
and that all have the same standard for determination of 
liability.  McDonald v. Pa., Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, Polk Ctr., 
62 F.3d 92, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Donahue v. 
Consol. Rail Corp., 224 F.3d 226, 229 (3d Cir. 2000); Kelly 
v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).  To prevail 
on an action under the Acts, a plaintiff must establish that he 
is a “qualified individual” with a “disability” who suffered an 
adverse employment action “because of that disability.”  
Turner v. Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  To satisfy the requirement of having a 
                                              
4
 On appeal, Macfarlan urges that, even if the District 
Court’s application of judicial estoppel was proper, other 
judicial remedies could be fashioned.  As an illustration, he 
suggests reimbursing Unum for the benefits received during 
the period in question.  In light of our discussion, we see no 
need to address this suggestion. 
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“disability,” a plaintiff may demonstrate any one of: an actual 
mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or 
more major life activities, a record of such impairment, or 
that his employer regarded him as having a disability.  
Marinelli v. City of Erie, Pa., 216 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 
2000).   
The District Court concluded, and Macfarlan does not 
contest, that he had neither an actual impairment that would 
satisfy the requirements of the Acts nor a record of such 
impairment.  Accordingly, Macfarlan’s claims under the Acts 
rise or fall on the question of whether Ivy Hill regarded him 
as having a qualifying disability under the Acts.  We conclude 
that the District Court properly found that Ivy Hill did not 
regard Macfarlan as having such a disability.  See Rinehimer, 
supra, 292 F.3d at 382.  (Rinehimer, a former employee of 
Cemcolift, Inc. failed to show that he was disabled under the 
“regarded as” prong of the Acts). 
 To demonstrate that an employer regarded an 
employee as having a qualifying disability, the plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the employer believed that a wholly 
unimpaired plaintiff had an impairment that substantially 
limited at least one major life activity or that the employer 
believed an employee’s actual impairment to limit major life 
activities when it in fact did not.  Tice v. Centre Area Transp. 
Auth., 247 F.3d 506, 514 (3d Cir. 2001).  Macfarlan contends 
that he falls into the latter category: that of an employee with 
a non-limiting impairment incorrectly regarded as having an 
impairment that limited him in at least one major life activity.  
Specifically, Macfarlan claims that once he was cleared to 
work fulltime, Ivy Hill incorrectly regarded him, because of 
his lifting restrictions, as impaired in a manner that 
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substantially limited him in the major life activity of 
“working.” 
 A “temporary non-chronic impairment of short 
duration is not a disability covered by the [Acts].”  
Rinehimer, supra, 292 F.3d at 380.  Macfarlan’s temporary 
lifting limitations, which were removed only four months 
after first imposed, are the very definition of such a non-
chronic impairment.  Accord Colwell v. Suffolk County 
Police Dept., 158 F.3d 635, 646 (2nd Cir. 1998) (holding that 
an impairment lasting seven months was too brief in duration 
to qualify as an ADA-qualifying disability).  Because 
Macfarlan’s lifting restriction was not a qualifying disability 
under the Acts, Ivy Hill’s regard of Macfarlan as unable to 
perform certain of his duties was permissible under the Acts.  
“It is insufficient for [Macfarlan] to show that [Ivy Hill] 
thought [he was], in some way, impaired.  Rather, 
[Macfarlan] must show that [Ivy Hill] thought [he was] 
disabled within the meaning of the statute[s].  The undisputed 
evidence shows that [Ivy Hill] did not consider [Macfarlan] in 
any way disabled and would have reinstated [him] 
immediately  if  . . . medically qualified.”  (Internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 
166, 179 (3d Cir. 2007).   
VI. 
The District Court’s July 28, 2010 order granting 
summary judgment to Ivy Hill on Macfarlan’s ADA, Rehab 
Act, and PHRA claims will be affirmed, as well as its order of 
May 12, 2011 denying reconsideration of its November 9, 
2010 order which had denied Macfarlan relief under the 
FMLA. 
